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PROCESS COSTS AND POLICE DISCRETION
Charlie Gerstein and J.J. Prescott∗
Cities across the country are debating police discretion. Much of this debate centers on
“public order” offenses. These minor offenses are unusual in that the actual sentence
violators receive when convicted — usually time already served in detention — is
beside the point. Rather, public order offenses are enforced prior to any conviction by
subjecting accused individuals to arrest, detention, and other legal process. These
“process costs” are significant; they distort plea bargaining to the point that the
substantive law behind the bargained-for conviction is largely irrelevant. But the
ongoing debate about police discretion has ignored the centrality of these process costs.
Many scholars have argued that vague terms and broad standards in defining public
order crimes result in broad discretion that leads to abuse. In this Essay, we argue
instead that criminal law process costs essentially decouple statutory language from
actual police behavior, rendering the debate about statutory language largely moot.
Abuse is better addressed by first recognizing that, in the context of public order crimes,
discretion has little to do with substantive criminal law. Instead, policymakers should
focus on mitigating the harmful consequences discretion can generate and on limiting
police discretion through other means. To this end, we propose providing the police
with new civil enforcement tools that will be equally effective at preserving order but
that will in all likelihood cause significantly less unnecessary harm.

Cities across the country are debating police discretion. New York,
for example, has recently endeavored to end its controversial practice
of stopping and frisking citizens as a matter of course.1 The debate
over police discretion implicates fundamental questions about the role
of police in American society, racial discrimination in the criminal system, and the disproportionate use of violence by the police against
young black men. Much of the debate over the proper scope of police
discretion centers on reforming the criminal code to decriminalize or
eliminate minor crimes. This Essay argues that the debate over the
proper scope of police discretion should instead focus on the real
source of that discretion: the process costs of low-level adjudication.
Minor crimes are a big problem. In 2006 alone, Americans were
charged with and detained on misdemeanor offenses approximately
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Charlie Gerstein is a Law Clerk to the Honorable J. Paul Oetken, United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, and a Research Fellow at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law. J.J. Prescott is a Professor at the University of Michigan
Law School. We would like to thank Josh Bowers, Seth Bowers, Sam Erman, Alec Ewald,
Colleen Fitzharris, Nick Frayn, Kate Gilbert, Sam Gross, Jason Harrow, Issa Kohler-Hausmann,
Justin Marceau, Joshua Matz, Eve Brensike Primus, John Rappaport, Laurent Sacharoff, Alex
Sarch, and Sonja Starr for their helpful comments on early drafts. We are also grateful to participants at the Robina Institute’s annual conference on the Future of the Criminal Law.
1 E.g., Joseph Ax, NYC Police to Reform Public Housing Stop-And-Frisk in Settlement,
REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2015, 4:38 PM), h t t p : / / w w w . r e u te r s . co m / a r t i cl e / 2 0 1 5 / 0 1 / 0 8 / u s - u s a - n e w y o r k
-stopandfrisk-idUSKBN0KH25R20150108 [http://perma.cc/L633-4ABD].
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10.5 million times.2 These cases have serious long-term consequences
for defendants, their families, and our criminal justice institutions.3
They create criminal convictions and criminal records.4 They crowd
our jails.5 And minor convictions are usually imposed with little process, without counsel, and often regardless of factual guilt or innocence.6 Worse, these crimes and convictions arguably form the core of
our criminal justice system: while most people incarcerated in the
United States were convicted of a felony, a large majority of criminal
sentences imposed come from misdemeanor and violation convictions.7
Many of these minor convictions result from what are often called
“public order” offenses.8 These offenses are relatively petty to be
sure, but their more important defining feature is that the actual sentence violators receive for their transgressions — usually time already
served in detention via a guilty plea — is not the “punishment” that
ought to matter to policymakers. In practice, our criminal justice
system primarily enforces public order prohibitions prior to any conviction by subjecting the accused to arrest, detention, and other legal
process.9 These “process costs” are significant; they include not just
pre-trial detention, but also the hassle of pre-trial and trial proceedings
and the risk and uncertainty that those proceedings necessarily en-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2 ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), https ://www.nacdl.or g/Wor kAr ea/DownloadAs s et.as px?id=2080 8

[https://perma.cc/8H2H-7E74?type=pdf].
3 See id. at 11–13; see also Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate Is Nearly $168,000,
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/nyregion/citys-annual
-cost-per-inmate-is-nearly-168000-study-says.html; Facilities Overview, CITY OF N.Y. DEP’T OF
CORR., http:// www.n yc.g ov/html/doc/html/about/facilities-overview.shtm l (last visited Apr. 9,
2015) [http://perma.cc/9KJ3-XDS4] (noting that on an average day, there are approximately
11,400 inmates in New York City’s jails).
4 E.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012).
5 See BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 7.
6 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2008).
7 Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1320–21.
8 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 556 n.14 (1997) (citing Robert C.
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and
Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168, 1217–19 (1996)).
9 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). For rough estimates of how many defendants plead
guilty to avoid prolonged detention, see generally Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the
Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2013) (“In 2010, in New York
City alone, 16,649 defendants were unable to make bail set at one thousand dollars or less,” id. at
1515 n.3, and “[d]efendants who are required to post bail that they cannot afford . . . end up
pleading guilty to avoid waiting in jail,” id. at 1515 (citing Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution
Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 348–52 (2011))).
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tail.10 These costs distort plea bargaining so much that the substantive
law behind the bargained-for conviction becomes irrelevant.11 Defendants are likely to spend more time in jail if they contest the charges than if they plead guilty. Not surprisingly, they almost always
plead guilty, whether or not they committed the charged offense and
despite the fact that the criminal conviction may result in serious consequences down the road.12
Maintaining public order is nevertheless an important civic function. Many of these offenses — disorderly conduct, minor trespassing,
loitering — attempt to serve this function by giving police discretion
that allows them to disrupt, to isolate, and to sober.13 The use of vague
terms and broad standards in drafting statutory language can deliver
such discretion. In the minds of some, however, discretion leads to
abuse, a conclusion that has engendered a heated debate about how
much statutory discretion the law should make available to police.14
We do not join this battle. Instead, we suggest that criminal law
process costs essentially decouple statutory discretion from actual police behavior, rendering the debate about statutory language largely
moot. In other words, in the minor crimes context, process costs —
not vague statutory terms — produce police discretion. Abuse is thus
better addressed by first recognizing that, in the context of public order crimes, discretion has little to do with substantive criminal law
and that, instead, focus is much better placed on mitigating the harmful consequences that discretion can generate and on limiting police
discretion through other means. To this end, we propose providing
the police with new civil enforcement tools that will be equally effective at preserving order but that will in all likelihood cause significantly less unnecessary harm. We believe — counterintuitively, perhaps — that giving the police an additional power (noncriminal arrest)
might encourage them to use the power they currently have (criminal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J.
SOC. 351, 374 (2013) (discussing “procedural hassle” as a technique for control of vulnerable populations); see also Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 86 (2007).
11 See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2563–64 (2004) (arguing that as the severity of the criminal offense decreases, the influence of the substantive law wanes).
12 Bowers, supra note 6, at 1119 (discussing the “innocence problem” in plea bargaining);
Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1323–27 (discussing collateral consequences); Gerstein, supra note 9, at
1526 (citing Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 987 (1989)).
13 See Livingston, supra note 8, at 591–92; see also Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community
Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 366–67 (2005).
14 Compare, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, and Livingston, supra
note 8, with, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Steven J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215.
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arrest) less frequently and, therefore, might reduce the harm that this
latter power causes.
Our argument begins with the fact that when the police feel they
need to arrest someone to keep people safe or to prevent property destruction, the police will, in most cases, arrest that person — regardless of how specific or general a given city’s criminal code may be.15
Why? Because the specificity of the criminal code has little relationship to the costs imposed by an arrest, and it is the ability to impose at
least some of these costs (for example, temporary removal and detention) that allow the police to achieve certain ends — disruption, isolation, and others.
American police have an extraordinarily diverse set of responsibilities,16 and they approach their work with a wide variety of goals in
mind. We do not mean to address these goals comprehensively. Rather, we focus only on the goal of “maintaining order” — chiefly, controlling or interrupting low-level misconduct and disrupting potential
short-term violence. To achieve this goal, police sometimes have no
choice other than to arrest people in order to temporarily isolate them
for a few hours or to remove them from a particular location. In such
a scenario, police may care about what happens before (and only some
of what happens before) any conviction, but not the conviction itself or
its consequences for the defendant.
If the police in certain circumstances are indifferent to whether a
defendant is convicted of a crime, a realized conviction is likely to be a
social waste. And in any event, code reforms are unlikely to control
police discretion. When discretionary arrests turn on considerations
other than the substantive law that underlies public order criminal offenses, police ought to have tools that do not trigger unnecessary collateral consequences, including criminal records, meaningless pleas,
unnecessary risk and uncertainty, and useless (from a police officer’s
perspective) process costs. Cities should adopt civil ordinances that
free the police to make discretionary arrests for low-level violations,
but limit the tendency of those arrests to inflict socially useless harm
on defendants.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I quickly recounts the realities of low-level criminal punishment in big cities and shows that
low-level arrests are untethered to substantive law, rendering solutions
that work within the criminal law unlikely to be effective at controlling police discretion. Part II outlines the debate over discretion to police public order, and argues that it neglects the reality that substan–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86; David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination
Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1071–73
(1999).
16 See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text.
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tive law is mostly irrelevant to the matter of police discretion in this
domain. Part III proposes a solution that comes from a long line of
police practice: civil laws with strictly limited periods of detention and
other features designed to reduce or eliminate those process costs that
have no connection to what police are supposed to be trying to do —
maintain order.
Before moving on, we note that the purpose of this Essay is not to
discuss whether the police should arrest people as often as they apparently do. Rather, operating on the assumption that the police do feel
the need to arrest people, we seek to ameliorate the consequences of
those arrests by reforming the law in a particular way. As we explain
below, we believe that our proposal (or something like it) can reduce
the negative effects of many public order policing arrests without increasing the total number or consequent burdens of such arrests.
I. ARRESTS FOR PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES
In very low-level misdemeanor prosecutions, the substantive criminal law that generates the punishment is largely irrelevant. Instead, a
conviction is the near-certain result of the arrest, and the punishment
is the process of criminal arrest, pretrial detention, and adjudication.17
Consider New York City today. The police see (or learn of) someone doing something they do not like.18 That person is arrested for a
minor offense,19 usually disorderly conduct,20 trespassing,21 loitering,22
possession of marijuana,23 or drinking on the street.24 This arrestee is
supposed to be arraigned by a judge within twenty-four hours,25 but
the process often takes much longer.26 In the interim, the arrestee
spends roughly four to six hours in a precinct holding cell before being

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17 See FEELEY, supra note 9, at 199; Bowers, supra note 10, at 86; Bowers, supra note 6, at
1119; Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1328; Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2568.
18 Sometimes, that can be wearing your pants too low. People v. Martinez, 905 N.Y.S.2d 847,
847 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
19 New York law characterizes many of these minor offenses as noncriminal violations.
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that these offenses create serious long-term problems. E.g.,
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 383.
20 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2008).
21 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2015).
22 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 2008).
23 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008).
24 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-125[b] (Westlaw through 2014 legislation).
25 See People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).
26 Joseph Goldstein, After Budget Cuts, Defendants’ Wait to See a Judge Often Exceeds 24
Hours, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2011), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 1 / 0 7 / 2 0 / n y r e g i o n / n e w - y o r k
-budget-cuts-lead-to-longer-waits-for-arraignment.html.
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transferred to courthouse lockup.27 When he finally sees a judge, if he
has a record, he is likely to be held on bail that he cannot afford.28
But even if he is released on his own recognizance, which, for defendants with a criminal record, is unlikely,29 the hassle of a trial — with
its many courthouse trips, where there might be long lines at secured
entrances30 — starts to look unmanageable. He is offered a plea deal
in which the twenty-four hours he just spent in lockup will in effect
serve as his sentence. If he does not take it, he will either remain in
jail until his trial — which could be a rather long time31 — or be
forced to attend a series of time-consuming and meaningless court appearances.32 If the defendant works full-time, these court appearances
are nearly impossible for him to attend. And so at arraignment he
does not contest whatever low-level offense is available and goes
home.33 Statutory law has no role in this type of prosecution.
Many have noted the startling lack of process in misdemeanor and
violation prosecutions generally, as well as the extent to which those
prosecutions are driven by process costs.34 The picture is bleak in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27 What Can I Expect If I’m Arrested?, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, h t t p : / / w w w . l e g a l - a i d . o r g / e n
/ineedhelp/ineedhelp/criminalproblem/faq/whatcaniexpectifiamarrested.aspx (last visited Apr. 9,
2015) [http://perma.cc/K4D8-AZDB].
28 Mosi Secret, N.Y.C. Misdemeanor Defendants Lack Bail Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/nyregion/03bail.html.
29 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 28 n.75, 29
tbl.3 (2010), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf [http://perma
.cc/NE8R-2G58] (noting that those with a misdemeanor conviction comprised 52.6% of those arrested on misdemeanors in New York City, but only 10.0% of those subsequently released on
their own recognizance).
30 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 386–87; William Glaberson, Faltering Courts,
Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 3 / 0 4 / 1 4 / n y r e g i o n
/justice-denied-bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html.
31 Glaberson, supra note 30; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 29, at 2 (reporting
that the average length of pretrial detention for someone who cannot make bail is 15.7 days).
32 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 375 (“[Defendants] must then sit patiently in a
crowded courtroom, sometimes all day, watching the seemingly inscrutable logic of other cases
being called and courtroom lulls, waiting for their 60–120 seconds in front of the judge. When the
lunch break is called at 1 p.m., the crowd of defendants who have been waiting since 9 a.m. for
their case to be called invariably express what could be understated as discontent. . . . If defendants fail to return for their case call after lunch a warrant will [likely] be issued.”).
33 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611 (2014). In New York City, 78.2% of all misdemeanor arrests result in either a conviction for a noncriminal violation (28.7%), a conviction for a misdemeanor (19.6%), or an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) (29.9%), where the charge stays on a defendant’s record for a year and is reactivated if the defendant is rearrested. Id. at 647 fig.10. In this Essay,
we occasionally refer to “guilty pleas” so as to include the ACD. This is because only a straight
dismissal gets you out of court without any record that can come back to haunt you, so agreeing
to an ACD is tantamount to pleading guilty for our purposes.
34 E.g., Bowers, supra note 10, at 86; Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 180 (2008); Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review,
and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1014
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New York, to be sure — but at least in New York defendants plead
guilty one at a time. In some jurisdictions, defendants are read their
rights and enter their guilty pleas en masse.35 Guilty pleas are a near
certainty.36 Adjudication, in the sense of determining, say, the factual
basis of guilt, is absent.37 This world of low-level criminal processing
does not remotely approach the criminal process taught in law school
classrooms. At least one scholar suggests that the misdemeanor system
in New York is no longer principally concerned with adjudication
at all — rather, she claims, its goal is to mark defendants with records
so that they can be effectively sorted in future encounters with the
system.38
As a matter of legal doctrine, New York’s disorderly conduct offense is limited in scope and difficult to prove.39 Same with open container violations.40 In the tiny minority of cases that do receive actual
judicial scrutiny, the New York Court of Appeals has espoused a
common law of disorderly conduct violations that sharply circumscribes the extent to which police can use these laws to intrude on individual liberties. But these laws routinely underlie convictions of defendants who did not violate, and could not have violated, them.41
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
n.15 (2011/12) (discussing “innocent defendants who plead guilty to avoid the process costs of a
criminal prosecution, in particular those who have been held long enough in pretrial detention
that they will get to go home if they accept the prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty in return for a
sentence of imprisonment that they have already served”); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at
670; Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1328–29.
35 Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1329 (citing FEELEY, supra note 9, at 10).
36 Id. at 1336.
37 Id. at 1317.
38 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 614.
39 See, e.g., People v. Jones, 878 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (N.Y. 2007) (“The conduct sought
to be deterred under the statute is ‘considerably more serious than the apparently innocent’
conduct of defendant here.” (quoting People v. Carcel, 144 N.E.2d 81, 84 (N.Y. 1957))); People v.
Richardson, 913 N.Y.S.2d 549, 554 (Crim. Ct. 2010) (dismissing complaint for failure to allege
mens rea of “intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,” id. at 552 (quoting N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2008)), where a police officer “observed the defendant shouting
obscene language to wit: ‘f**k off n[**]ga, stop f**king with me’ in a public area,” id. at 551);
People v. Stephen, 581 N.Y.S.2d. 981, 982 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (holding that defendant had not engaged in “violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior” within the meaning of Section 240.20
when he screamed at a police officer “Fuck you . . . If you were in jail, I’d fuck you, you’d be my
bitch . . . If you didn’t have that gun and badge, I’d kick your ass, I’d kill you,” id. at 982 (internal quotation marks omitted), and where “a crowd of approximately 15–20 people gathered who
joined the defendant yelling, ‘Yeah, fuck the police,’” id. at 982–83).
40 See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, 948 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (Crim. Ct. 2012) (dismissing open container violation because “[w]hile the arresting officer’s professional training and sense of smell
may be sufficient to support his conclusion that defendant was drinking beer, such does not support the conclusion that the beer contained more than one-half of one percent (.005) of alcohol by
volume because the beverage could have very well been non-alcoholic beer”).
41 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 650 (describing
disorderly conduct as “an all-purpose generic charge” that does not indicate “that the defendant
is guilty of any specific illegal conduct”).
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There are particularly stark examples of this phenomenon: people
often plead guilty to crimes that, by virtue of either repeal or unconstitutionality, the police can no longer legally enforce.42 In 1993, the Second Circuit struck down New York’s loitering statute because it violated the First Amendment on its face and enjoined the City from
prosecuting charges under the statute.43 Yet between 1992 and 2004,
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) arrested 1876 people
for violating that very statute.44 Eddie Wise, one of those defendants,
was convicted of violating the unconstitutional statute seven times after it was declared unconstitutional.45 In 2005, local lawyers again
sued to enjoin the NYPD from enforcing the statute.46 (They won.47)
But the reminder didn’t stop the NYPD from issuing 641 summonses
and arresting 58 people for loitering even after the suit was filed.48
Marijuana arrests present an equally stark example. In New York,
possession of marijuana in public view is a misdemeanor.49 But, since
1977, having marijuana in your pocket is a noncriminal, nonarrestable
violation.50 Between 1996 and 2011, New York City alone made
586,320 arrests for possession of marijuana in public view.51 In most
of these arrests, the marijuana “becomes ‘open to public view’ only
after the police stop individuals and either ask them to empty their
pockets or conduct a frisk.” 52 Local public defenders, because they
were concerned that these arrests “present[ed] clear constitutional and

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
42
43
44
45

See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86.
See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 701, 705–06 (2d Cir. 1993).
See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86.
Elva Rodriguez et al., Beggar Gets Change, Wins Suit Forcing City to Lay Off Panhandlers,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 11, 2005, 12:00 AM), h t t p : / / w w w . n y d a i l y n e w s . c o m / a r c h i v e s
/news /beggar -change-wins -s uit-for cing-city-lay-panhandler s-ar ticle-1.6245 27 [http ://perma.cc
/ 5 5 7 A - M Y P 3]. Professor Josh Bowers was Eddie Wise’s attorney, and describes Wise’s story in
greater detail in Bowers, supra note 10, at 85.
46 Bowers, supra note 10, at 86; Rodriguez et al., supra note 45.
47 Rodriguez et al., supra note 45.
48 Kati Cornell Smith, Beggar Buster Blues — Judge Blasts NYPD, N.Y. POST (Nov. 30,
2006, 5:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2006/11/30/beggar-buster-blues-judge-blasts-nypd [http://perma
.cc/NFE4-8NEG].
49 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008).
50 1977 N.Y. Laws 478–83 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2008)).
51 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A RED HERRING: MARIJUANA ARRESTEES DO NOT
BECOME VIOLENT FELONS 1 (2012), h t t p : / / w w w . h r w . o r g / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / r e p o r t s / u s
_mj1112webwcover.pdf [http://perma.cc/X99Z-N7C4]. We thank Issa Kohler-Hausmann, a coauthor of this report, for her helpful comments on this point.
52 Id. at 11 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10).
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evidentiary problems,” 53 began trying to take these cases to trial.
They were unable to try a single case.54
How this happens is no mystery. The process costs so outweigh the
defendant’s perceived costs of pleading guilty that it seems to make
very little sense to contest even patently invalid charges. Almost everyone pleads guilty,55 even though many did not commit (or could not
have committed) the charged offense. This is because successfully
fighting the charge is worse for the defendant, at least in the short run,
than pleading guilty. The Fourth Amendment, then, imposes no restrictions on police behavior in this realm of criminal punishment, beyond the distant possibility of a § 1983 civil rights suit.56 Because the
police can be confident that a trial on these charges is at worst a remote possibility, the exclusion remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is meaningless.
These public order arrests create a cascade of problems for those
defendants who are frequently stopped by the police. In well-studied
New York, a defendant’s first misdemeanor arrest often results in an
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), where the charge is
dismissed after a year if the defendant stays out of trouble.57 But if
the defendant gets rearrested within the next year, the ACD usually
results in a worse offer from the prosecution, and often a formal conviction for the offense on which he was rearrested.58 And, during the
year the ACD is pending, potential employers can see (and make decisions on the basis of) the arrestee’s record.59
But while prosecutors may aim for criminal convictions, the police
have much less reason to care about dispositions for loitering, disorderly conduct, or open-container arrests. At least in theory, in some circumstances, they ought to care only about the arrest and prearraignment detention.60 With rare exceptions, once the very low-level
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
53 Marijuana Arrest Project, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs
/the-marijuana-arrest-project (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2CFC-AXBR].
54 William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 30, 2013), h ttp://ww w.nytim es.com/201 3/ 05/ 01/nyregion/justice-denied-for-misdemeanor
-cases-trials-are-elusive.html.
55 Or, in New York, accepts an ACD that stays on his record for a year. Kohler-Hausmann,
supra note 33, at 648–50.
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
57 See supra note 33.
58 Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 668 (“If a defendant with [an ACD] from a prior arrest
is brought back to criminal court on a new arrest, the offer on the new case will go up along one
vector or another — the seriousness of the mark, the conditions he must satisfy to be granted the
disposition, or the formal sentence.”).
59 See id. at 648. Indeed, the purpose of New York’s misdemeanor system may be to mark
defendants so that they can be treated differently when they are subsequently arrested. See id. at
649.
60 See generally FEELEY, supra note 9.
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defendant is arrested, the police have accomplished their immediate
goal of maintaining order. Of course, the defendant is also prosecuted,
convicted, and permanently marked by the system, but these fallen
dominos are hard to pin on the police. The public expects the police to
maintain order, but when an arrest is necessary, the law often arms officers — at least officially — with only the powerful and blunt tools of
criminal law. This is a destructive mismatch: public order or “quality
of life” policing is conducted almost entirely outside the shadow of
substantive criminal law and almost entirely within the discretion of
the police.61
The problem stems from the misalignment of purposes between the
police, who primarily (and optimistically) seek to prevent crime and
keep streets safe, and district attorneys, who focus more immediately
on pursuing chargeable offenses.62 Prosecutorial involvement in a case
typically begins when someone has already been arrested. At least according to some, prosecutors are interested in minimizing the risk that
a defendant emerges from the system without being “marked” so that,
in the event the person reoffends, the prosecutor is not blamed.63
Prosecutors are not well positioned to weed out those public order arrests that should never have led to a criminal conviction. The police,
on the other hand, are expected to enforce public order. They likely
care less about the escalating penalties of the criminal system than
prosecutors do. But when the police make public order arrests, they
(perhaps inadvertently) start a process of escalating punishment that is
ill suited to the task of order maintenance.64
“Criminal” public order enforcement is counterproductive in other
ways. For one, it erodes the label “crime.” When we ask the police to
maintain public order, we do not ask them to focus on crime or to arrest criminals as the typical person uses those terms. We ask them to
regulate behavior that may inadvertently create some risk to the public; to deter chronic low-level misconduct that doesn’t rise to the level
of criminality;65 and even to be our primary — and maybe exclusive — agent for dealing with people with substance abuse problems,
the mentally ill, and the homeless.66 Calling this sort of policing
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
61
62

See generally Livingston, supra note 8.
See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33 (arguing that prosecutors’ principal goal in
misdemeanor and violation cases — in New York, at least — is to mark defendants for future
encounters).
63 Id. at 667–68 (citing an interview with a New York public defender).
64 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 668–70.
65 See generally Ellickson, supra note 8.
66 See HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 9 (1977) (“The police have come
to be viewed as capable of handling every emergency.”); Peter C. Patch & Bruce A. Arrigo, Police
Officer Attitudes and Use of Discretion in Situations Involving the Mentally Ill, 22 INT’L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 23, 23 (1999).
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“criminal” makes the term mean less,67 and therefore makes it less
powerful, eroding any deterrent or expressive value of a criminal sanction.68 Worse still, this approach brands as “criminals” many who
have merely offended other people’s sensibilities or who have engaged
in what almost everyone agrees is very minor misconduct that in reality very rarely poses a risk to physical safety.69
Because defendants cannot (realistically) contest the charges against
them, policing outside the substantive law also leaves no account of
what happened — or why.70 The sentence imposed is in effect subverted by the process, which ought to be administrative and incident
to punishment, not the punishment itself. Cases are often resolved at
arraignment,71 and very rarely at trial,72 so there is no record of why
the system punished someone. All we’ll ever know is that someone
was convicted of “disorderly conduct.” 73 Those who read the record
might think the worst.74 A criminal record is chief among the unintended and unnecessary costs generated by relying on criminal law to
maintain public order. A person arrested for an essentially noncriminal public order offense becomes part of the criminal system alongside
those guilty of genuinely transgressive conduct and about whom society would agree on assigning the label “criminal.” Because of the wide
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2005) (arguing that
prosecutors must consider the signals their prosecutions send to the public).
68 See Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137, 155
(1951) (“To stigmatise the ordinary person by the epithets ‘criminal,’ ‘offender,’ and ‘conviction,’
is itself a punishment, and, from a deterrent point of view, it is important that the emotion invoked by these words should be kept at full strength and not weakened by their indiscriminate
application.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2550 (identifying “a basic irony about criminal
law: the more it expands, the less it matters”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997).
69 Cf. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans.,
Free Press 1984) (1893) (defining “ criminal” acts as those that shock the collective conscience of
society).
70 Indeed, New York City has refused to disclose (and may not even have kept track of) how
many convictions were generated in non-felony cases between 2002 to 2010. Ray Rivera & Al
Baker, Data Elusive on Low-Level Crime in New York City, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/nyregion/02secrecy.html.
71 Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 654 (“In New York City over 57% of all misdemeanor
and violation cases reach a disposition at arraignment.”).
72 See id. at 650 (noting that fewer than 0.5% of misdemeanor cases go to trial).
73 Consider Michigan law, which criminalizes being a “disorderly person” but “provides no
standards as to what is a public disturbance.” People v. Gagnon, 341 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983) (per curiam).
74 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 650 (“In practice, a ‘dis con’ serves as an allpurpose generic charge to mark the defendant for a specific length of time, not to indicate that the
defendant is guilty of any specific illegal conduct.”); cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,
189 (1997) (expressing concern that when a prior conviction is an element of an offense, withholding the facts of the earlier case “ may be like saying, ‘never mind what’s behind the door,’ and
jurors may well wonder what they are being kept from knowing”).
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variety of conduct covered by public order prosecutions, employers are
unlikely to bother drawing distinctions.
Is there a justification for uniformly marking arrestees with criminal convictions in the context of public order offenses? Certain classes
of low-level offenses are apparently poor predictors of serious criminality in the future.75 In some jurisdictions, the probability of being convicted of a more serious low-level offense, as opposed to a less serious
one, is chiefly a function of how long it has been since the individual’s
last arrest.76 Because people in highly policed areas are arrested at
much higher rates, the combination of these facts likely produces a
cascade of arrests and convictions that have little relationship to the
goals of public order policing (and much more to do with a person’s
neighborhood and race).
Finally, there is simply the matter of how much all of this costs.
Public order arrests often result in a lengthy period of pre-arraignment
detention77 — perhaps well in excess of the sentence any institutional
actor would rationally want to impose for the “violation.” The defendant is processed by the court system’s personnel and in its buildings and is provided a court-appointed lawyer. All of this jailing and
processing translates into a nontrivial amount of money and, in any
event, imposes needless suffering.
The debate about police discretion cannot move forward as long as
the police are compelled to use extralegal means to police public order
by imposing criminal punishment. Using the process in this way interferes with other institutional actors’ ability to limit police discretion: as
it stands today, most discretionary arrests result in a conviction with
serious consequences. In these arrests, everything seems to have gone
right, so the public — including much of the legal academy — continues to think that the text of the substantive law can meaningfully constrain police behavior.78
II. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF POLICE DISCRETION
There has long been a vigorous debate over how much discretion
to give the police in initiating street encounters and making low-level
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
75 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 674–76 (describing the results of an empirical
study of New York City arrest data).
76 See id. at 690.
77 See Goldstein, supra note 26 (describing pre-arraignment detentions lasting up to three days
and an average detention length of thirty-one hours).
78 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 8, at 561 (“Courts cannot ‘solve’ the problem of police discretion by invalidating reasonably specific public order laws — as some have attempted — without seriously impairing legitimate community efforts to enhance the quality of neighborhood
life.”).
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arrests.79 This debate is alive today in the fight over New York’s controversial stop-and-frisk policy and its practice of arresting people for
marijuana possession.80 Some scholars claim that the density of urban
spaces requires new forms of police discretion to maintain “social
norms” and to smooth community tensions.81 They argue that the increasing empowerment of black communities means that the Constitution should leave them alone to “protect themselves through the political process.” 82 Courts should no longer be suspicious that public order
laws are designed to keep black people out of community life because,
the argument goes, black communities increasingly write those laws
themselves.83
The early incarnation of this debate centered on City of Chicago v.
Morales,84 which involved a broad antigang loitering ordinance that
allegedly gave police the power to arrest (or harass) whomever they
wanted. The ordinance essentially criminalized “remain[ing] in one
place with no apparent purpose.” 85 Some maintained that this language was fatally overbroad and gave the police inordinate discretion
to arrest people for innocent conduct86 — the Court agreed — while
others argued that this broad language was necessary for the police to
do their jobs and maintain order for the benefit of minority communities.87 This debate implicitly assumes, however, that you can have either specific criminal laws that constrain the police, or very general
laws that allow the police broad discretion.88 This is a false dichoto–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
79 Compare, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998), Livingston, supra note 8, and Meares & Kahan, supra
note 14, with Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 14, Cole, supra note 15, and Natapoff, supra note
4.
80 E.g., Joseph Goldstein, Marijuana May Mean Ticket, Not Arrest, in New York City, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/nyregion/in-shift-police-dept-to-stop
-low-level-marijuana-arrests-officials-say.html; Editorial, The Truth Behind Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), http://ww w.nytimes.com/2011/ 09/ 03/opinion/the-truth-behind-stop-and
-frisk.html.
81 See, e.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 79, at 1163–64.
82 Cole, supra note 15, at 1061 (citing Kahan & Meares, supra note 79).
83 Id.
84 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
85 Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Morales is the most recent in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated local qualityof-life ordinances on vagueness grounds. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983);
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971).
86 Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 225–37.
87 Meares & Kahan, supra note 14, at 209–14.
88 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 777–78 (1999) (“For the last several
decades, conservative commentators have called for a relaxation of the vagueness doctrine as well
as procedural restraints on police discretion to permit bolder law enforcement efforts to investigate, punish, and prevent crime.”).
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my. What the law says — the specific conduct it defines and criminalizes — does little to constrain police discretion in the enforcement of
very low-level violations. The need to control police discretion could
hardly be more important, but in the context of public order offenses,
it has at best a very weak connection with substantive criminal law.89
Regardless of how offenses are defined, the police can still use them
to generate convictions by using the process to force guilty pleas.
Therefore, by focusing primarily on the content of substantive law,
policymakers pay too little attention to the real agent of criminal punishment in this setting: the process costs of a criminal arrest.
To illustrate this disconnect, consider an example. Imagine that
drinking on the street — a very specific activity — were no longer
prohibited in a particular city. Someone is then arrested for drinking
on the street in this city even though drinking on the street no longer
violates any criminal or administrative rule. If he is offered a plea
bargain at his arraignment, he will probably take it, as the previous
Part shows. Thus, if the police encounter someone drinking on the
street in a manner that they find disruptive or objectionable, they can
(and also clearly know they can) still arrest that person despite the fact
that drinking on the street is no longer against the rules.
The disconnect stems from a fact that has been true of lower courts
since at least the 1950s: the process is the punishment.90 Beginning
with the “due process revolution,” 91 when the Bill of Rights was incorporated against the states, lower courts have used the process of adjudication to enforce substantive norms of behavior. Because they are
no longer able — at least formally — to enforce order without fairly
extensive process, the criminal system evolved to use the costs that the
process generates to enforce order.92
But the political system and much of the legal academy continues
to believe that code reforms can serve to control police discretion. Indeed, in response to the criticism that marijuana arrests do almost
nothing to protect public safety,93 “New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo introduced legislation to make possession of marijuana in public view a non-arrestable, non-criminal violation,” just like possession
in your pocket.94 Despite support from all five New York City district
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 Contra, e.g., Livingston, supra note 8, at 561 (“Courts cannot ‘solve’ the problem of police
discretion by invalidating reasonably specific public order laws — as some have attempted —
without seriously impairing legitimate community efforts to enhance the quality of neighborhood
life.”).
90 FEELEY, supra note 9.
91 E.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN COURT’S
IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW (1970).
92 E.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 374–81.
93 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 19.
94 Id. at 4.
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attorneys,95 the legislation failed because of opposition from upstate
and suburban legislators.96 Both sides of this debate neglected the reality that code reforms cannot alone control police discretion. In other
words, even if the legislation passed, if the NYPD wanted to continue
arresting people for marijuana possession in public view — despite the
fact that it would have become a nonarrestable offense under the
law — there would be nothing to stop them.
Other norms and institutions are much better suited to constrain
police discretion. Indeed, the political process that led to the passage
of Chicago’s gang-loitering ordinance may have strongly influenced
police behavior in favor of aggressive enforcement and vigorous public
order policing.97 Civilian oversight can constrain police discretion.98
So can consent decrees with the Justice Department.99 Perhaps most
importantly, law enforcement departmental norms can restrain discretion.100 But in the context of minor crimes — the lowest level of criminal punishment — police discretion appears to be largely immune to
substantive criminal law.
Fortunately, there is reason to be hopeful about the possibility for
reform in our cities. After the legislation in New York to decriminalize marijuana possession in open view failed, the political movement
behind those substantive reforms continued to apply pressure to political actors to change practice, if not the law. Turning their focus away
from the criminal code, opponents of marijuana arrests were able to
persuade New York City simply to stop making them.101
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
95
96

Each borough of New York City has its own district attorney.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 5; Thomas Kaplan & John Eligon, Divide in
Albany Kills Proposal on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/06/20/nyregion/cuomo-bill-on-marijuana-doomed-by-republican-opposition.html.
97 Professors Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan argue rancorously with Professors Albert
Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer about how the political process in Chicago ended up generating
the anti-gang loitering ordinance. Compare Meares & Kahan, supra note 14, at 199–200 (claiming
that black communities on the South and West Sides of Chicago birthed the ordinance), and
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White, and Gray: a Reply to Alschuler and
Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 247–51 (same), with Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note
14, at 217–20 (arguing that aldermen from predominantly white wards were the real movers behind the ordinance). Both sides do agree that the process was loud, open, and unusually prominent in the eyes of citizens and police.
98 See generally Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151 (2003).
99 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 140–44 (1998), h t t p : / / w w w . h r w . o r g / r e p o r t s
/pdfs/u/us/uspol986.pdf [http://perma.cc/GTA6-AUCP] (discussing consent decrees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 14141); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 844–47 (1999).
100 Cf., e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
101 Goldstein, supra note 80.
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It is important to recognize the limits of our claim. In prosecutions
for serious crimes, the substantive scope of criminal conduct really
does matter. As the ratio of the expected sentence to the threatened
process costs grows, plea bargaining outcomes increasingly mirror trial
outcomes.102 It thus matters whether drugs are illegal. It matters very
little, however, whether Chicago criminalizes loitering with “no apparent purpose” or “causing a disturbance.” Similarly, our claim is
limited to relatively large jurisdictions, where the process costs are
high. Smaller jurisdictions may function quite differently.
Finally, this entire discussion is not to say that the text of the criminal code does nothing, even in the context of low-level crimes. Criminal prohibitions send important signals to the public and to the police
about the scope of proper conduct.103 They can have a tremendously
important expressive value, outlining for the citizenry conduct that is
to be encouraged and conduct that ought to be forbidden. They can
send important messages to the police about the proper scope of their
ability to intrude on individual liberty. Our point here is only that,
whatever they do, criminal codes do not meaningfully constrain police
discretion in the context of public order offenses.
III. REDUCING PROCESS COSTS AND
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
High process costs of low-level criminal adjudication are the problem. The police can — at their discretion and unconstrained by substantive criminal law in any meaningful way — impose draconian, but
often unnecessary, even counterproductive, costs on defendants and
their families. The police do not necessarily do this out of spite or incompetence. They simply need tools to police public order (often by
making arrests), and criminal law is usually all that they have.
We offer one potential solution: in order to reduce the harm of discretionary, low-level arrests — by limiting the process costs and collateral consequences they can generate — we propose a strippeddown, civil form of arrest, the consequences of which include only the
arrest itself and a brief period of noncriminal detention.104
Counterintuitively, we believe that the availability of such a tool will
cause police to use their power to arrest someone for a crime less often,
not more. An important historical analog to this approach is the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
102
103

See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2550–58.
For a tiny sample of the vast literature on this subject, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Lawrence v.
Texas and the Limits of the Criminal Law, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 33–34 & n.145 (2007)
(citing Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1623
(1998) (book review)).
104 We discuss briefly below why we believe this proposal is unlikely to significantly increase
the volume of total arrests.
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“drunk tank,” in which officers would lock up dangerously inebriated
people to sober up overnight.105 No formal criminal process need be
involved and no criminal record would result. Although the debate
about police discretion has centered on the substantive scope of lowlevel regulation, we focus on the real-world process of arresting people
for low-level offenses and seek a way to avoid criminal records and
disproportionate, socially wasteful costs. If the police are going to enforce public order through discretionary arrests, society would benefit
from providing law enforcement with the legal instruments to do so
safely, effectively, and legitimately.
To be more specific, we propose complementing (or, alternatively,
replacing) public order crimes with a class of civil ordinances that allow only very brief detentions. First, these ordinances should strictly
limit the total time of detention imposed — including the sentence and
the period that anyone can be detained on suspicion of a violation —
to twenty-four hours at the very longest.106 Ideally, the limit would be
even shorter. The ordinances should not allow for the imposition of
fines or monetary payments of any kind. Second, the ordinances
should permit an arrestee to attack the legitimacy of his detention ex
post via mail or telephone and to waive in-person arraignment or any
other appearance requirement. Lastly, these ordinances should be
noncriminal and should not, under any circumstances, leave the defendant with a recorded violation of any kind. The police should be
required to retain reliable records of whom they arrested and why, but

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
105 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 8, at 640; see also Joshua Partlow, Holiday Rush at Mexico
City’s Hangover Prison, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the
_ a m e r i c a s / h o l i d ay - r u s h - a t - m e x i c o- c i t y s - h a n g o v e r -p r i s o n / 2013/ 12/ 2 6/ 4e d f c f 10- 6d c c - 11e 3- a 5d 0
-6f31cd74f760_story.html [http://perma.cc/2BL7-RAZ4]. On the subject of history, it is also worth
noting that the earliest Western police forces were permitted — indeed, required — to effect noncriminal, low-process arrests. Early common law arrest doctrines recognized a distinction between the authority of the police in matters of crime and the authority of police in matters of order. For example, the Statute of Winchester, which established London’s first police force in
1285, provided that watchmen were authorized and charged “‘as . . . in Times [passed]’ to ‘watch
the Town continually all Night, from the Sun-setting unto the Sun-rising’ and were directed that
‘if any Stranger do pass by them, he shall be arrested until Morning.’” Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333 (2001) (quoting Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, c. 4
(Eng.)); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of
Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 58 (2007) (“‘A watchman may arrest a night walker by a warrant in
law.’ . . . In effect, being out after dark in town was so suspicious that it was grounds for a temporary arrest . . . .” (quoting 2 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND 52 (1642))). We thank Josh Bowers for his helpful comment on this point.
106 New York currently has serious problems complying with a twenty-four-hour deadline for
arraignments. See Goldstein, supra note 26. That said, this deadline should be much easier to
comply with, though compliance is by no means a certainty.
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those records should be accessible to the public only in a reliably
anonymous form.107
These features serve to reduce the unnecessary harm that low-level
criminal arrests ultimately impose on arrestees. No longer will there
be any reason for you to plead guilty to time served or to accept an
ACD-like outcome — you will already have served the maximum
penalty you can receive. No longer will there be any reason to plead
guilty to avoid trial. You can conduct a paper adjudication if you
want to vindicate your version of events, or just let it go — either
way, you will not wind up with a criminal record. Lastly, no matter
what happens, you’re back home in twenty-four hours or less.108
Such laws would still allow the police to do all the things public
order policing enthusiasts expect them to do. Rarely, if ever, do the
police need more than a twenty-four-hour detention to accomplish the
goals of public order policing: disrupting and isolating, primarily. If
the police believe that more than twenty-four hours of detention is appropriate, then other policing goals are in play, and the police should
typically arrest for a more serious crime for which the defendant
should be charged and tried. In this situation, the criminal system becomes appropriate, and the plea bargaining process functions better
because the sentence the defendant would face upon conviction often
exceeds the process costs of fighting the charge.109 Our goal is simply
to provide the police with tools that allow them, in appropriate situations, to avoid high process costs and unnecessary collateral consequences while maintaining public order.
When police arrest people for low-level crimes, they seek a wide
variety of ends, depending on the context. Sometimes police want to
clear a corner where drug dealers are congregating.110 Sometimes they
want to send a signal to a neighborhood that they are in control.111
Often, police are maintaining a sense of order in the community, even
manifesting that order through the regulation of physical spaces.112
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
107 Cf. Jeffrey M. Skopek, Anonymity, the Production of Goods, and Institutional Design, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 1751 (2014) (discussing various aspects of anonymity in the modern legal
structure).
108 To again use New York City as an example, these detentions should be at the local station
house, rather than in the currently overcrowded jails. Even short periods of time in overcrowded
jails can be traumatizing and degrading. Station-house lockups — where police are generally
present nearby and periods of detention are very brief — should serve to minimize the cruelty of
detention.
109 See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2563–64.
110 See Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1332.
111 See id. at 1333.
112 See, e.g., William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department’s Civil Enforcement of
Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 447 (1995) (NYPD Commissioner discussing the city’s efforts at policing quality-of-life crimes); Robert C. Ellickson, supra note 8; Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513 (2002).
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They are almost always our front-line responders to mental illness and
substance abuse; thus police arrest people to keep them safe or ensure
that they receive care.113 Sometimes the police have illegitimate reasons.114 But no matter why the police make public order arrests, they
should rarely be invested in whether the person they’ve arrested is ultimately convicted. The ordinances we suggest leave the police equally effective at maintaining order, but eliminate entanglement in the
criminal process as a near-certain result. And, similarly, by lowering
process costs, the proposed ordinances can bring public order policing
aboveboard, allowing the debate about how much discretion the police
should have to occur on more productive terrain.
We recognize that police departments may want to use low-level
arrests to incapacitate or simply to keep track of people they worry
may pose a threat. With respect to the former possibility, police may
use low-level arrests to keep potentially violent criminals off the street
for more than a few days,115 although the evidence suggests that this
approach is unlikely to be effective.116 For better or worse, our proposal does not eliminate the police’s ability make such arrests, although it may frustrate certain plausible law enforcement aims. The
police may be concerned, for instance, about the long-term trajectory
of chronic low-level violators. By arresting people for, say, drinking
on the street, police can keep track of how many times a person has
been caught drinking in public and can escalate his punishment accordingly. By allowing an individual police officer to use an unrecorded, noncriminal arrest, our proposal may interfere with the ability of
the police to achieve this goal.
In theory, a system of criminal misdemeanors may serve many
purposes: it may seek to punish, to deter, and to mark. It may even
serve to incapacitate. But the current system achieves these purposes
at significant expense. From our perspective, the issue in the public
order policing domain is the disparity between the purposes of the police in some circumstances (short-term incapacitation) and the costs of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
113
114

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 66, at 9.
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the formal criminal misdemeanor system. We can accomplish shortterm incapacitation in a much more humane and less costly way. Public order policing issues are in large part noncriminal, and diverting
low-level violators from the criminal system will provide a fairer and
lower-cost alternative to the current practice.
This paper does not take a position on the appropriate amount of
discretion to give the police in maintaining public order. Nonetheless,
assume for the moment that whatever the optimal level of discretion
happens to be, police in many big cities currently have too much; and
assume that, as a separate matter, police arrest people too often. You
might think that our proposal will make both of these problems worse,
not better. In response to the first concern (too much discretion), the
current system appears to constrain police minimally in this area of
criminal law — if it constrains them at all — so our proposal will not
free the police much more than the status quo already does. We have
a similar response to those who are concerned that our proposal would
weaken defendants’ ability to fight the underlying merits of their
claims: they have very little ability to do so at present, so, at worst, our
proposal is neutral.
With respect to the concern that our proposal will lead to more arrests, though, we are more cautious. Perhaps the hassle of a formal
criminal arrest under the current system provides some disincentive to
the police. If our proposal makes it faster and easier for the police to
arrest people, the argument goes, they will do it more. But there is no
good reason to believe that an arrest leading to civil detention under
our proposal is (or has to be) any less difficult than a formal criminal
arrest is today for the police. For prosecutors, defense lawyers, court
personnel, and judges, our system eliminates a tremendous amount of
work. The police, on the other hand, still have to arrest someone, lock
him up, and fill out paperwork explaining why.
If these civil arrests are no easier on police, however, one might
next wonder: why would the police even bother with these new tools
when they can arrest someone for basically any reason without them?
To this we have two responses. First, we emphasize that, because police discretion at present is hardly constrained at all, our proposal cannot make the situation worse. Even if only a few police officers use
the new tools because they recognize the unnecessary costs and consequences that an arrest for a low-level crime can generate for the offender or his family, a few is better than none. Second, we hope that
policymakers will give police officers incentives to use these new tools
in appropriate circumstances. We note that any policy or practice that
makes a criminal arrest more costly to police in absolute terms (e.g.,
requiring an additional explanation for why the police officer preferred
a criminal arrest to a civil arrest) would in theory induce police to use
the civil tools without increasing the total number of arrests. But,
more generally, what incentives policymakers, the press, the bar, or
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police departments might employ, and how they would be implemented, is a matter for another essay.
Our proposal might also prompt someone to ask: Why do police
need to arrest people at all? If we are concerned about the current system of meaningless pleas and useless process, why not scrap it altogether? Police, indeed, use a wide array of nonarrest techniques to
calm situations and ease tensions — why must they arrest?
In reply, we simply point to the fact that police under the current
system arrest people for very low-level crimes all the time.117 If we
simply removed prohibitions on public order offenses from the statute
books, there is actually no solid reason to believe people would not
continue to be arrested for violating them anyway — or that police
would not arrest people for a more serious crime, perhaps exacerbating
the current situation.118 The importance of the debate about how
much discretion to afford the police — and about how much public
conduct to prohibit — cannot be understated, but we do not believe
significant progress can be made simply by reforming the criminal
code. Police almost certainly arrest people too often, but this reality is
not driven by the substantive content of criminal prohibitions. If our
proposal is adopted and a less destructive form of arrest becomes established, we can turn to other, more productive, means to advance
the debate over police discretion to arrest.119
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